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While economists usually resort to redistribution between individuals of diﬀerent skill
levels and majority voting when explaining migration policies, the present political econ-
omy model of preferential trade and migration agreements suggests an alternative approach
based on the following two observations. Firstly, in the presence of free trade in goods
between the member states of the EU, migration between the member states mainly re-
distributes income between individuals employed in the traded and the non-traded sectors.
Secondly, various episodes of restrictive migration legislation suggest that lobbying from
vocal interest groups rather than majority voting shapes migration policies in the EU.
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EUI WP ECO 2005/61I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economists usually resort to arguments based on redistribution between individuals of diﬀerent
skill levels when explaining immigration policies. Immigration is viewed as having diﬀerent
eﬀects on native individuals of diﬀerent skill levels either through direct wage competition,
or indirectly through the public welfare system.1 Immigration policy is then determined by
majority voting, i.e., by the native individual with median skill level.2 Various episodes of
restrictive immigration legislation in the European Union (EU) suggest an alternative approach.
An illustrative episode of restrictive immigration legislation in the EU is the German Entsende-
gesetz (Posted Workers Act) of March 1996, which was followed at the European level by the
EU Posted Workers Directive of December 1996. Basically, these two directives restrict free
trade in labour services by obliging companies to employ temporary workers according to the
conditions of the host country.3 As an oﬃcial justiﬁcation for host country control, the gov-
ernments voiced concerns about potentially negative eﬀects of free trade in labour services on
the welfare of the general public. In particular, these legal measures were supposedly adopted
in order to prevent welfare detrimental ‘wage dumping’. However, a closer look at the debate
surrounding both the Entsendegesetz and the EU Posted Workers Directive suggests a diﬀerent
interpretation.4 Rather than concerns about the welfare of the general public, it was political
pressure from special interests, mainly lobbies representing the construction sector, that led to
host country control for temporary workers. Emphasising the asymmetry in observed trade and
migration policies, Pelkmans (2001:167), for example, concludes: ‘Why competitive advantage
in goods markets can ‘legitimately’ be based on [diﬀerences in economic development], but not
in (this) services market (namely, construction) or in factor markets, can only be explained by
political economy.’
The Posted Workers legislation of 1996 is clearly intended to limit immigration into sectors
that make intensive use of low-skilled labour. However, mobility restrictions in the EU are
1See Soellner (1999) for a theoretical analysis of how immigration aﬀects natives through direct wage com-
petition and Razin and Sadka (2001) for both a theoretical and empirical treatment of how immigration aﬀects
natives through the public welfare system.
2See, for instance, Benhabib (1996), Bilal, Grether and DeMelo (2003) or Ortega (2005).
3These conditions include among others minimum wages, minimum paid holidays, maximum working hours,
non-discrimination, safety at the workplace.
4See Rotte and Zimmermann (1998) for a discussion of the Entsendegesetz and Pelkmans (2001) for a discus-
sion of the EU Posted Workers Directive.
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EUI WP ECO 2005/6not conﬁned to low-skill intensive sectors. Pelkmans (2001:170) notes that professionals such
as dentists, physicians, accountants, lawyers, notaries and pharmacists use overly complicated
diploma recognition procedures to limit immigration into their sectors. The Financial Times
(2004a) reports how lobbying from craft guilds precluded a major reform of the German craft
sectors5 that rely on formal skill requirements to limit entry, in particular of immigrants.6
An especially illustrative episode of restricting free migration in the EU emerged in the
negotiations over the Eastern Enlargement. While the negotiating parties agreed on fully lib-
eralising trade with each other,7 they were granted the right to impose migration restrictions
for a transitional period of seven years.8 It was mainly political pressure from the Austrian and
German governments that led to the inclusion of these provisions into the accession treaty. This
is hardly surprising if the fact that Austria and Germany were expected to be the main des-
tination countries for migrants from the acceding countries is taken into consideration. What
is particularly striking, however, is that the governments’ stances were heavily inﬂuenced by
political lobbying from the construction sector and the craft sectors. A German Government
Press Release (2001), for example, calls for the ‘restriction of the freedom to provide services
in speciﬁc areas, in particular in the construction and the craft sectors.’ The ability of speciﬁc
sectors to inﬂuence the Austrian and German governments’ stances on migration becomes even
more apparent in an additional provision of the negotiations treaty that applies only to these
two countries. According to the European Commission (2003), ‘Austria and Germany have the
right to apply ﬂanking national measures to address serious disturbance or the threat thereof, in
speciﬁc sensitive service sectors on their labour markets, which could arise from the cross-border
provision of services.’
Two common features emerge from these episodes. Firstly, attitudes toward immigration do
not necessarily vary across individuals of diﬀerent skill levels but rather across individuals of
diﬀerent sectoral aﬃliations. Most importantly, anti-immigration sentiments are pertinent in the
5The craft sectors include carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical installation, bakery among others. They
provide in their wide majority goods or services that are non-tradeable internationally.
6According to the Financial Times (2004a) the formal educational requirement, the so called Meisterbrief,t o
set up a company requires ‘years of extra training and costs up to 50,000 euro.’
7The 15 existing member states of the EU and the 10 acceding states agreed on eliminating all existing trade
barriers between each other without any sectoral exemptions. However, safeguard mechanisms may be triggered
in cases where an acceding state does not fully apply the Acquis Communitaire, say for example in the veterinary
ﬁeld.





EUI WP ECO 2005/6non-traded sectors. Secondly, rather than by majority voting the migration related legislation
in the above examples is determined by political lobbying from vocal interest groups.
To capture these stylised facts in a formal political economy model, the present paper focuses
on the negotiations over the Eastern Enlargement o ft h eE U .O n eo ft h em o s tc o n t r o v e r s i a li s s u e s
in these negotiations was whether to introduce bilateral free trade only or whether to addition-
ally introduce bilateral free migration. While the existing member countries of the EU favoured
the introduction of bilateral free trade only, the acceding countries favoured the additional in-
troduction of free migration. The present paper provides a rationalisation of these negotiating
positions based on the non-traded sector and political lobbying. The logic underlying the for-
mal political economy model is as follows. Bilateral free trade aﬀects only individuals employed
in the traded sectors. While individuals employed in the export sectors gain from bilateral
trade liberalisation, individuals employed in the import competing sectors lose. Individuals em-
ployed in the non-traded sector are indiﬀerent on the bilateral trade liberalisation issue. This
is precisely the pattern of individual preferences Mayda and Rodrik (2005) ﬁnd in their recent
analysis of survey data.9 So long as there is a suﬃcient balance between export sectors and im-
port competing sectors in each country, bilateral free trade is then viable even if traded sectors
are organised into interest groups. Intuitively, the balance between export and import sectors
ensures that there is a suﬃcient number of exporter interest groups pitted against the importer
interest groups on the bilateral trade liberalisation issue. Since bilateral free trade equalises fac-
tor prices in the traded sectors, factor price diﬀerences and hence migration incentives persist
only in the non-traded sector. This is consistent with the stylised fact that in OECD countries
immigrants are mainly employed in the non-traded sector. OECD (2004:55), for instance, ob-
serves that ‘foreigners are generally over-represented in construction, hospitality and catering,
as well as household services [...].’ The additional introduction of free migration eliminates any
remaining factor price diﬀerences between the two countries. It drives down the factor price
in the non-traded sector of the destination country while it drives up the factor price in the
non-traded sector of the source country. If the non-traded sector in the potential destination is
9Strictly speaking, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) ﬁnd that individuals employed in the import competing sectors
are signiﬁcantly less likely to be pro-trade than individuals employed in the non-traded sectors while there is no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between individuals employed in the exporting sectors and those employed in
the non-traded sectors. The latter result is probably due to the speciﬁc wording of the survey question that is
meant to elicit opinions on import restrictions and not on overall trade liberalisation.
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EUI WP ECO 2005/6organised into an interest group, it lobbies the government to reject the additional introduction
of bilateral free migration. In the potential source country, the interest group representing the
non-traded sector lobbies the government to endorse it. The additional introduction of bilateral
free migration then depends on the details of the international negotiations process.
The political economy of migration policy is currently a very active area of research.10 While
the major part of the literature uses the median voter model to analyse the endogenous formation
of migration policies,11 some contributions explore the use of pressure group models. Hanson
and Spilimbergo (2001) and Facchini and Willmann (2005) apply the Grossman and Helpman
(1994) model of endogenous trade policy formation to the analysis of the endogenous formation
of multilateral migration policies. The present paper follows these contributions in using a
pressure group model but diﬀers from them in three important respects. Firstly, it applies the
Grossman and Helpman (1995) (henceforth: GH (1995)) model of the negotiations over a Free
Trade Agreement to the analysis of the endogenous formation of bilateral migration policies.
Secondly, it extends the GH (1995) model to accomodate a non-traded sector. This synthesises
two current topics of research. Facchini and Testa (2004) analyse the endogenous formation of
bilateral migration policies, albeit in a median voter framework, without explicitly modelling
a non-traded sector. Bowen and Wu (2004) analyse the economic eﬀects of immigration in
the presence of a non-traded sector but do not explicitly model the endogenous formation of
migration policies. Thirdly, in the present paper bilateral trade and migration policies are
determined simultaneously. The present paper may thus also contribute to the solution of the
Bhagwati (1991) puzzle: In the light of the Mundell (1957) result of the equivalence of trade
and migration ﬂows, why are observed trade policies less restrictive than observed migration
policies?
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic setup of
the model. Using this basic setup, Section 3 analyses the economic eﬀects from the formation
of a Customs Union and from the introduction of free migration. Section 4 turns to political
economy issues while Section 5 derives the main results using speciﬁc functional forms. Section
6 concludes.
10See, for instance, the survey of Facchini (2004).
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2.1 Policy Options
The model examines the trade and migration policy options of two small countries J ∈ {H,F}
that interact with each other and the rest of the world. In the status quo (SQ), the two economies
under consideration apply most favoured nations tariﬀs and do not allow immigration.12 They
face the policy options of either forming a Customs Union (CU), i.e., eliminating trade barriers
between each other and adopting a common external tariﬀ, or forming a Common Market (CM),
i.e., additionally introducing free migration. The qualitative features of the economies under
consideration are similar. In the following description of production and demand structures,
country superscripts are therefore dropped.
2.2 Production
The production structure consists of a standard speciﬁc factors model of international trade
augmented by a non-traded sector. More speciﬁcally, sector 0 produces a freely traded numeraire
good under constant returns to scale with the intersectorally mobile factor (M)a l o n e . I ti s
assumed that production in the numeraire sector is always positive and that the input-output
coeﬃcient is 1 which amounts to ﬁxing the return to the mobile factor at 1. The remaining
n +1non-numeraire sectors each use one sector-speciﬁcf a c t o r( Si) and the intersectorally
mobile factor M. Production takes place under constant returns to scale. n non-numeraire
sectors produce n traded goods that may be subject to trade taxes. One non-numeraire sector
produces a non-traded good whose price is determined by domestic supply and demand. M
is interpreted as sector-unspeciﬁc labour and Si as labour that, in the short term, is speciﬁc
to sector i. While Si is assumed to be immobile intersectorally, it is assumed to be mobile
internationally.13 In taking this short term perspective, the present model follows Hillman and
Weiss (1999) that propose the speciﬁc factors model with its short term rents and sectoral wage
12This seems a reasonable approximation of the immigration policy adopted by European countries after 1973.
Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002:64), for instance, note that ‘in many continental European countries -
namely Germany, France, Denmark, and Sweden - labour immigration was reduced to small numbers after the
ﬁrst oil price crisis 1973.’
13For instance, sector speciﬁcity may derive from the acquisition of skills that, in the short term, are not
transferable across sectors but that are transferable internationally.
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EUI WP ECO 2005/6competition between natives and immigrants as the appropriate model to analyse the formation
of attitudes toward immigration.
2.3 Demand
Individuals have identical preferences. Each individual maximises a quasi-linear utility function
of the form u = c0 +
Pn+1
i=1 ui (ci),w h e r ec0 is consumption of the numeraire good 0 and ci is
consumption of the non-numeraire good i, i =1 ,2,...,n +1. The sub-utility functions ui (·) are
diﬀerentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. The numeraire sector absorbs all general equi-
librium eﬀects from price changes in sector i,e ﬀectively making demand in sector i independent
from prices in the n remaining non-numeraire sectors. Demand for the non-numeraire goods is
given by di (pi), where the demand function di (·) is the inverse of u0
i (ci). Consumption of the
numeraire good is given by the diﬀerence between the individual’s income and its expenditure
on the non-numeraire goods.
2.4 Factor Ownership
Each individual in the population owns one unit of the intersectorally mobile factor M. Addi-
tionally, individuals own at most one type of speciﬁc factor. The fraction of the population that
owns speciﬁcf a c t o rSi is denoted by αi. Two further assumptions on speciﬁcf a c t o ro w n e r s h i p
simplify the analysis of the lobbying and migration decision considerably. Firstly, the lobbying
decision is simpliﬁed by assuming that ownership of speciﬁcf a c t o rSi is very concentrated in
the population, i.e., αi is assumed to be very small. Welfare of the group owning speciﬁcf a c t o r
Si is given by the sum of the group’s mobile factor reward, its speciﬁc factor reward, rebated
tariﬀ revenue and consumer surplus. It can be shown that the relative weight of the speciﬁc
factor reward in the group’s welfare increases with the degree of concentration of ownership of
speciﬁcf a c t o rSi in the population.14 So long as ownership of speciﬁcf a c t o rSi is suﬃciently
concentrated in the population, i.e., αi is suﬃciently small, the speciﬁc factor owners’ welfare
can be approximated by the speciﬁc factor reward πi (pi). In other words, the lobbying decision
in favour of or in opposition to a trade and migration policy regime is entirely determined by





EUI WP ECO 2005/6speciﬁcf a c t o rSi the speciﬁc factor is distributed uniformly. This ensures that the speciﬁcf a c t o r
reward is also the only determinant of speciﬁc factor owners’ welfare at the individual level.15
Individual speciﬁc factor owners hence base their migration decision entirely on the comparison
of speciﬁc factor rewards in their home country and the potential destination country. They
migrate if the speciﬁc factor reward in the potential destination country is higher than in the
home country, while ignoring eﬀects of migration on their individual welfare through consumer
surplus and rebated tariﬀ revenue.
3E c o n o m i c E ﬀects of the Customs Union and Free Mi-
gration
This section analyses the eﬀects of the CU and free migration on speciﬁc factor rewards πi (pi),
consumer surplus CSi (pi) ≡ ui [di (pi)]−pidi (pi) and tariﬀ revenue Ti (pi,t i)=ti [d(pi) − x(pi)],
where before the formation of the CU the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ rate ti applies to all imports while after
the formation of the CU it applies to imports from outside the CU only and is zero otherwise.
For illustrative purposes, the analysis of the economic eﬀects of the CU in the traded sectors is
analysed separately from the economic eﬀects of free migration in the non-traded sector.
3.1 The Customs Union in the Traded Sectors
Since the present paper’s main focus is on migration policies rather than on trade policies, it
is suﬃcient for the present purpose to consider the following simple special case of a CU.16 It
is assumed that in the SQ tariﬀso ne x p o r tg o o d sa r ez e r o , 17 while tariﬀs on import goods are
positive. Algebraically, tEX
i =0and tIM
i > 0, where the superscripts denote export and import
goods, respectively. Further, in the SQ an exporting industry in country H is an importing
industry in country F and vice versa. Country H exports and country F imports in a fraction s
of the industries and country H imports and country F exports in the remaining fraction 1−s.
In other words, all industries are mirror images, with country H exporting in some industries
15See Appendix A.3.
16Rather than adding new insights to the literature on the viability of a bilateral trade agreement, the reason
for considering a CU is a technical one. With a CU already in place the additional introduction of free migration
aﬀects the non-traded sector only (see Section 5.3 for the technical details).
17GATT rules prohibit export subsidies while export taxes are rarely used in reality.
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2 , which is the harmonised external tariﬀ rate the
CU members are assumed to agree upon.18 World prices are normalised to one and it is assumed
that the CU as a whole is an importer on world markets in all the industries so that the internal
price in the CU is actually given by pCU
i =1+tCU
i .19 The CU tariﬀ revenue is assumed to be
distributed according to the countries’ shares of importing industries in the SQ, i.e., country H
receives the fraction 1 − s of the CU tariﬀ revenue and country F receives the fraction s.20
Suppose, ﬁrstly, that industry i is an importing industry. Since the CU-tariﬀ is lower than
the importing industry’s SQ-tariﬀ, the formation of the CU induces a price decrease in industry
i.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tdπi (pi)/dpi = xi (pi) > 0,w h e r exi (pi) denotes production in sector
i.21 Hence, the formation of the CU and the implied price fall in industry i lead to a decrease
in the speciﬁc factor reward πi (pi). Under the standard concavity assumptions on ui (xi) made
in Section 2.3, the eﬀect of the price fall in importing industry i on consumer surplus CSi (pi)
is positive.22 The eﬀect of the CU on tariﬀ revenue TRi (pi,t i) in industry i is ambiguous. On
the one hand, the elimination of the tariﬀ on imports from the CU partner country leads to a
loss in tariﬀ revenue. On the other hand, the price fall in sector i leads to an increased volume
of imports and might thus lead to an increase in tariﬀ revenue.23 While the direction of the
economic eﬀects from the CU is unambiguous for factor rewards and consumer surplus, it is not
possible to resolve the ambiguity for tariﬀ revenue without specifying speciﬁc production and
utility functions.
Suppose, secondly, that industry i is an exporting industry. The formation of the CU leads
to an increase in the domestic price in industry i because the CU-tariﬀ is positive while the
tariﬀ under the SQ is zero. Hence, the factor reward πi (pi) increases and consumer surplus
18GATT Art. XXIV requires that ‘the common tariﬀ arrangements of the preferential group toward third-
country “external” trade not be “on the whole” more restrictive than the “general incidence of” duties and
regulations before the CU was formed.’ See Jackson (1997:166).
19I ft h eC Ua saw h o l ew e r ea ne x p o r t e ro nw o r l dm a r k e t sa tpCU
i =1+tCU
i , the internal price in the CU
would fall below 1+tCU
i . Two cases can be distinguished. (i) If the total CU supply equals or exceeds total CU
demand at world prices, the internal price in the CU falls to 1. (ii) Otherwise the internal price in the CU is
determined by the intersection of total CU supply and total CU demand, i.e., pCU
i ∈ (1,1+tCU
i ).
20This amounts to assuming that the the CU tariﬀ revenue in industry i accrues to the country that is importing
good i in the SQ.
21See Appendix A.1.
22See Appendix A.2.
23The ambiguous eﬀect of the CU on tariﬀ revenue reﬂects the opposing forces of trade diversion and trade




EUI WP ECO 2005/6CSi (pi) decreases. There is no change in tariﬀ revenue. Both before and after the formation of
the CU industry i is an exporting industry. Since export duties are zero by assumption, tariﬀ
revenue is zero in both cases. The economic eﬀects from the formation of the CU in industry i
are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1: Economic eﬀects from the CU
Importing industry Exporting industry
pi Decrease Increase
πi (pi) Decrease Increase
CSi (pi) Increase Decrease
TR i (pi,t i) Ambiguous Constant
3.2 Free Migration in the Non-Traded Sector
The induced change in sectoral demands is the only channel through which free migration in
the non-traded sector may aﬀect the traded sectors. However, the assumption of concentrated
factor ownership eliminates this channel. The reason is that even if all the owners of speciﬁc
factor Si decide to migrate, they only constitute a negligible fraction αi of the total population.
Hence, the introduction of free migration in the non-traded sector does not aﬀect tariﬀ revenue.
Further, it aﬀects pNTS only through shifts in domestic supply, where, for convenience, the
subscript NTS rather than n +1is used to denote the non-traded sector. The direction of the
eﬀect of the domestic price on factor rewards and consumer surplus is as in the traded sectors.
Algebraically, ∂πNTS(pNTS)/∂pNTS > 0 and ∂CSNTS(pNTS)/∂pNTS < 0. Migration of the
factor speciﬁc to the non-traded sector leads to an outward shift of the domestic supply schedule
in the destination country and to an inward shift in the source country. In the destination coun-
try, immigration thus leads to a decrease in pNTS a n da na s s o c i a t e dd e c r e a s ei nπNTS(pNTS),
where πNTS(pNTS) denotes factor rewards to the native speciﬁc factors. The change in con-
sumer surplus CSNTS(pNTS) associated with the decrease in pNTS in the destination country
is positive. In the source country, emigration leads to an increase in pNTS a n da na s s o c i a t e d
increase in πNTS(pNTS),24 while consumer surplus CSNTS(pNTS) decreases. The economic
24Note that for the source country the increase in factor rewards from free migration can be split into the
increase for the migrants and the staying speciﬁc factors. In the absence of migration costs, speciﬁcf a c t o r s
migrate until factor rewards are equalised across countries. In the migration equilibrium factor rewards are then
equal for the migrants and the speciﬁc factors staying in the source country. Splitting the increase in factor
rewards into the increase for the migrating and the staying speciﬁc factors is then equivalent to considering
πNTS (pNTS), i.e., the joint factor reward to the migrating and the staying speciﬁcf a c t o r s .
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2.
Table 2: Economic eﬀects from free migration
Variable Destination Country Source Country
pNTS Decrease Increase
πNTS (pNTS) Decrease Increase
CSNTS (pNTS) Increase Decrease
4 Political Economy
The political process is modelled as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the domestic political
equilibrium in country J ∈ {H,F} is determined through the interaction of domestic lobbies
and the government. In the second stage, the equilibrium trade and migration policy regime
is determined in bilateral negotiations. The two-stage game is solved through backwards in-
duction taking into account that in the ﬁrst stage the domestic lobbies anticipate the bilateral
negotiations in the second stage. Before deriving the solution to the two-stage game in Section
4.2, Section 4.1 analyses the political process in one country as if it were a one-stage game. This
illustrates the interaction between domestic interest groups and the government.
4.1 Domestic Political Equilibrium
In the domestic political process, lobby groups representing speciﬁcf a c t o ro w n e r so ﬀer the
government campaign contributions that are contingent on the adoption of their preferred trade
and migration policy regime. This is modelled as a menu auction àl aBernheim and Whinston
(1986), where the government represents the auctioneer and the lobby groups represent the
bidders. The government maximises an objective function of the type Gr =
Pn+1
i Cir + aWr,
where Cir ≥ 0 denotes lobby i’s nonnegative campaign contribution contingent on the adoption
of trade and migration policy regime r ∈ R, R ≡ {SQ,CU,CM},a n da denotes the weight the
government places on average welfare W.25 Each lobby has complete information on the other
lobbies’ gross payoﬀs πir.
A Nash Equilibrium in this menu auction is completely characterised by Deﬁnition 1.
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n
i=1 ,e r) is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if
(i) Cir ≥ 0 for all i, r ∈ R




i Cir + aWr]
(iii) for no lobby i there exists C
0
ir and r0















i >π ih r − Cih r.
Condition (i) simply states that contribution schedules are feasible under the nonnegativity
constraint on Cir. Condition (ii) follows from payoﬀ maximisation on the part of the government.
If condition (iii) were not satisﬁed for some lobby i,t h e nl o b b yi would have an incentive to
deviate from Cih r given the contribution schedules of the other lobbies and the government’s
objective function since it disposes of an alternative contribution schedule that would leave it
with higher proﬁts net of contributions.
There is, typically, a large number of contingent contribution oﬀers and government choices
that satisfy the four conditions in Deﬁnition 1. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) focus their
discussion on a particular subclass of Nash Equilibria with appealing properties, which they label
Truthful Nash Equilibria. In essence, in Truthful Nash Equilibria, lobbies submit contribution
schedules that reﬂe c tt h ec h a n g ei ng r o s sp a y o ﬀs from a change in the trade and migration policy
regime. The notion of truthfulness is ma d em o r ep r e c i s ei nt h ef o l l o w i n gd e ﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2 Cir is said to be a truthful contribution schedule relative to e r if and only if for all
r ∈ RC ir = max[0,πir − (πih r − Cih r)].
In words, if lobby i submits a truthful contribution schedule relative to e r, its contribution
oﬀer for all r 6= e r is either such that its net payoﬀ under regime r is equal to its net payoﬀ
under regime e r, or it is zero. When its contribution oﬀer is zero, its net payoﬀ under regime
r is smaller than under regime e r. In this case, equalisation of net payoﬀs between regimes r








is said to be a Truthful Nash Equilibrium if and only if it is a Nash
Equilibrium and {Ci}
n+1
i=1 are truthful contribution schedules relative to e r.
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outcome maximises the joint payoﬀ of the bidders and the auctioneer. In the present context,
this means that the trade and migration policy regime selected in a Truthful Nash Equilibrium
maximises the joint payoﬀ of the lobbies and the government, where the joint payoﬀ under regime
r is given by Pr ≡
Pn+1
i πir + aWr.26 With respect to the selected trade and migration policy
regime, the menu auction framework àl aBernheim and Whinston (1986) is thus equivalent to
a framework without campaign contributions in which the government maximises the reduced
form objective function Pr ≡
Pn+1
i πir + aWr. This is stated more formally in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Let e r denote the trade and migration policy regime selected in all Truthful Nash
Equilibria of the menu auction. e r is identical to the trade and migration policy regime selected
by a government maximising a reduced form objective function Pr ≡
Pn+1
i πir + aWr in a
framework without campaign contributions.
Since Lemma 1 only requires the evaluation of speciﬁc factor returns and average welfare
under the various trade and migration policy regimes, it simpliﬁes the determination of the
regime selected in the domestic political political process considerably. The remainder of the
paper therefore focuses on Truthful Nash Equilibria of the menu auction and applies Lemma 1
to determine the trade and migration policy regime chosen in the domestic political process. By
focusing on Truthful Nash Equilbria it is implicitly assumed that lobbies are able to coordinate
in the sense that they can communicate but cannot make binding commitments. Bernheim
and Whinston (1986) show that in this environment of unlimited but non-binding pre-play
communication no Nash Equilibria other than the Truthful Nash Equilibria survive.27 Truthful
Nash Equilibria are thus the only Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria in the sense of Bernheim,
Peleg and Whinston (1987).
4.2 International Political Equilibrium
Instead of explicitly modelling the bargaining process in the bilateral negotiations, it is assumed
that the adoption of a trade and migration policy regime requires that the regime chosen in the
domestic political process be the same in the two countries. Algebraically, the adoption of e r in
26See Theorem 2 in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) for a formal proof.




EUI WP ECO 2005/6the bilateral negotiations requires that e r = e rH = e rF. The international political equilibrium
is then determined by backwards induction. The lobbies in one country anticipate the bilateral
negotiations in the second stage and therefore make their contribution oﬀers conditional on their
expectations of the domestic political process in the other country. The political process in the
ﬁrst stage can either be modelled as a game in which countries move simultaneously or as a
game in which they move sequentially.
4.2.1 Simultaneous Game
The interaction between domestic lobbies and the government when lobbies do not anticipate
the bilateral negotiations in the second stage has been discussed in Section 4.1. The insights
from this discussion can be used to solve the game in which governments move simultaneously in
the ﬁrst stage of the game and lobbies anticipate the bilateral negotiations in the second stage.
With lobbies anticipating the bilateral negotiations in the second stage, the interaction between
domestic lobbies and the government remains essentially unchanged. The key diﬀerence between
the one-stage game and the two-stage game is that the menu auction in country I ∈ {H,F}
reduces to a menu auction over achievable regimes given the expectations about the regime
selected by the government of country J 6= I. If the domestic lobbies in country I expect the
government in country J to select e rJ = SQ, then their set of achievable regimes is a singleton and
is given by RI|
¡
e rJ = SQ
¢
= {SQ}. If they expect e rJ = CU then RI|
¡
e rJ = CU
¢
= {SQ,CU}
and if they expect e rJ = CM then RI|
¡
e rJ = CM
¢
= {SQ,CM}. Similarly, RJ|
¡





e rI = CU
¢
= {SQ,CU} and RJ|
¡
e rI = CM
¢
= {SQ,CM}. Using Lemma 1, the
Truthful Nash Equilibrium outcome of the two-stage game is then deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4 e r is a Truthful Nash Equilibrium outcome of the two-stage game if and only if
(i) e r ∈ argmax
r
PI
r ,w h e r er ∈
©
RI|e rJ = e r
ª
and
(ii) e r ∈ argmax
r
PJ
r ,w h e r er ∈
©
RJ|e rI = e r
ª
.
To illustrate the solution of the two-stage game, it is helpful to consider the following simple
example. Suppose in country H the joint payoﬀs to the lobbies and the government under the
three trade and migration policy regimes are given by PH
SQ =0 , PH
CM =1and PH
CU =2while
in country F they are given by PF
SQ =0 , PF
CU =1and PF
CM =2 . This is summarised in the
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Table 3: Payoﬀ matrix
H\FS Q C U C M
SQ (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
CU (0,0) (2,1) (0,0)
CM (0,0) (0,0) (1,2)
Application of Deﬁnition 4 shows that in this simple example any of the three trade and mi-
gration policy regimes may be selected in a Truthful Nash Equilibrium. One way of overcoming
the problem of multiple Truthful Nash Equilibria is to model the ﬁrst stage as a game in which
countries move sequentially.
4.2.2 Sequential Game
Modelling the ﬁrst stage as a game in which countries move sequentially overcomes the problem
of multiple Truthful Nash Equilibria only at the price of conferring agenda-setting power on one
of the negotiating countries. Although this is a stark assumption that might not be valid in
more general settings, it seems a reasonable approximation of the negotiations over the Eastern
Enlargement of the EU. Arguably, the existing member countries of the EU set the agenda for
the negotiations by selecting the CU as their preferred trade and migration policy regime. The
acceding countries then saw themselves confronted with the choice between the SQ and the CU.
They agreed to the CU not because it was their preferred trade and migration policy regime but
because their preferred regime, the CM, was simply not on the agenda. In the words of Poland’s
foreign minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, ‘his country accepted demands from the 15 existing
EU members on allowing labour restrictions during often tortuous accession negotiations “not
because we believed it was right but because we saw it was necessary.”’28
If countries move sequentially in the ﬁrst stage of the game, the equilibrium trade and
migration policy regime is eﬀectively determined in a three-stage game. Suppose country I ∈
{H,F} moves in stage 1a and country J 6= I moves in stage 1b. As in Section 4.1, the trade and
migration policy regime in country I is determined in a menu auction over the set of achievable
regimes. The key diﬀerence to Section 4.1 is that the domestic lobbies in country I anticipate
the best response of the domestic lobbies in country J. This allows them to select the Truthful




EUI WP ECO 2005/6Nash Equilibrium of the three-stage game that yields the highest payoﬀ to them. A Truthful
Nash Equilibrium outcome of the three-stage game is then deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5 e r is a Truthful Nash Equilibrium outcome of the three-stage game if and only if
(i) e r ∈ argmax
r
PI
r ,w h e r er ∈
©
RI|e rJ = e r
ª
,
(ii) e r ∈ argmax
r
PJ
r ,w h e r er ∈
©
RJ|e rI = e r
ª
and
(iii) there does not exist e r0 that satisiﬁes (i) and (ii) such that PI
h r0 >P I
h r .
To illustrate the solution of the three-stage game, it is helpful to resort to the simple example
in Section 4.2.1. It is easily veriﬁed that in this example any of the three trade and migration
policy regimes satisﬁes conditions (i) and (ii) of Deﬁnition 5. Suppose now that I = H and
J = F, i.e., domestic lobbies in country I move ﬁrst. Then only e r = CU additionally satisﬁes
condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 5. In other words, if country H has the power to set the agenda,
the CU is selected in any Truthful Nash Equilibrium of the three-stage game. This corresponds
roughly to the situation during the negotiations over the Eastern Enlargement of the EU, with
country H representing the existing member countries of the EU and country F representing
the acceding countries. While the example in Section 4.2.1 builds on an assumed constellation
of the joint payoﬀs to the lobbies and the government in country H and country F,i ti sp o s s i b l e
to derive this constellation in a formal economic model.
5 The Model with Speciﬁc Functional Forms
Consider the model with speciﬁc functional forms. Production in the n+1non-numeraire sectors
is assumed to be inelastic.29 More speciﬁcally, supply in the non-numeraire sectors is given by
XJ
i = SJ


















The speciﬁc factor in sector i earns a higher reward in the country with the higher price. This
means that, with free migration of speciﬁc factors between countries, speciﬁc factors migrate
29Assuming inelastic supply functions in the n +1non-numeraire sectors is equivalent to assuming that each
non-numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale with the speciﬁcf a c t o rSi only. Strictly speaking,
the example in this section therefore slightly departs from the above speciﬁcf a c t o r sf r a m e w o r k . T h em a i n
diﬀerence is that with inelastic supply functions there is no increase in production eﬃciency from free migration.
However, assuming inelastic supply functions allows to derive analytical results without qualitatively altering the
implications from a speciﬁcf a c t o r sf r a m e w o r k .
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to be quadratic yielding linear sectoral demands of the form di (pi)=D − bpi.30 Following the
structure of Section 3, Section 5.1 ﬁrst analyses the transition from the SQ to the CU in the
traded sectors. Section 5.2 then proceeds to analyse the transition to free migration in the
non-traded sector. Section 5.3 combines the insi g h t sf r o ms e c t i o n s5 . 1a n d5 . 2t oa n a l y s et h e
transition from the SQ to the CM.
5.1 The Customs Union in the Traded Sectors
The aggregate endowment in any single traded sector over the two countries is normalised to 1.






θ in a fraction s of the traded sectors
(1 − θ) in a fraction 1 − s of the traded sectors
,
where s ≥ 1
2 and θ>1
2. Endowments in the n traded sectors in country F mirror endowments






(1 − θ) in a fraction s of the traded sectors
θ in a fraction 1 − s of the traded sectors
.
Before the formation of the CU tariﬀs on export goods are zero, while tariﬀs on import goods are
set according to the tariﬀ-setting rule in Grossman and Helpman (1994). Under the assumption
that all traded sectors are politically organised and that factor ownership is highly concentrated




ab ,w h e r etJ
i denotes country J’s speciﬁct a r i ﬀ
in sector i.31 In words, the tariﬀ rate is higher the larger the size of the sector, the lower the
government’s weight on average welfare and the lower the demand elasticity. World prices are









,( R 1 )
30The subutility functions take the form ui (ci)=D






EUI WP ECO 2005/6sectors with speciﬁc factors endowment θ export before the formation of the CU, while sectors
with speciﬁc factors endowment (1 − θ) import.32 From the above assumptions on speciﬁc
factor endowments in countries H and F, it follows that an exporting industry in country H is
an importing industry in country F and vice versa. The arithmetic mean of the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ
in country H and country F is then tCU
i =
(1−θ)
2ab , which is the harmonised external tariﬀ that
the CU members are assumed to agree upon. The above parameter restriction further ensures





2ab .33 The case described by the above parameter restriction
is summarised for one good in Figure 1, in which, for notational simplicity, it is assumed that
country H has endowment θ and country F has endowment (1 − θ).
Figure 1: The CU (traded sectors)
Notice that, in Figure 1, country F’s import demand is positive at pF
i and country H’s
export supply is positive at pH
i = pW
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i country H’s export supply is
smaller than country F’s import demand, the CU, as a whole, is an importer of good i on world
markets.
Under parameter restriction (R1) and the above assumptions on functional forms and the
harmonised external tariﬀ, it is possible to evaluate a sector’s share in the aggregate change in
factor rewards and its share in the change in average welfare implied by the transition from the












































i =( 1− θ)
,( 2 )
where ∆CU (.) denotes the diﬀerence between the CU and the SQ value of a variable. The share
of traded sector i in country J’s change in the joint payoﬀ to the lobbies and the government
dP J













4 + a(θ − (D − b))
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4 − a(θ − (D − b))
i
< 0 if SJ
i =( 1− θ)
.( 3 )
It can further be shown that the transition from the SQ to the CU yields the following aggregate


















which is strictly positive. This means that the CU under consideration is strictly welfare bene-
ﬁcial for the two participating countries as a whole. An international negotiation process that
maximises the joint welfare of the two countries would thus always lead to the adoption of the
CU. However, the negotiation process outlined in Section 4 might lead to an ineﬃcient negoti-
ation outcome, in the sense that it does not maximise the joint welfare of the two negotiating





EUI WP ECO 2005/6larger share of import competing industries rejects the transition from the SQ to the CU.35
Since the adoption of the CU requires the consent of both negotiating governments, the CU
is rejected and the SQ is maintained for s>s.N o t e t h a t s depends critically on the level of
the harmonised external tariﬀ. McMillan (1993) documents that countries forming preferential
trade agreements often ﬁnd ways around GATT Art. XXIV and harmonise the external tariﬀ
on a higher level than assumed here. While tCU
i =
(1−θ)
2ab should therefore be viewed as a lower
bound on the politically optimal harmonised external tariﬀ, the insight that the CU is viable
for s suﬃciently low is robust to assuming a higher level of the harmonised external tariﬀ.T o
see this, note that for any tCU
i >
(1−θ)
2ab , import industries stand to lose less from the CU and
export industries stand to gain more than with tCU
i =
(1−θ)
2ab . Since this increases the critical
threshold s above which the CU becomes unviable, the necessary condition for the viability of
the CU is relaxed. The insight that the CU is viable for s suﬃciently low remains essentially
unchanged, however.
To summarise, under parameter restriction (R1) and the above assumptions on functional
forms and the harmonised external tariﬀ, the transition from the SQ to the CU is unambiguously
welfare beneﬁcial for the two participating countries as a whole. Under the political process
outlined in Section 4 the transition to this welfare beneﬁcial CU might, however, be rejected. In
particular, this is the case when the distribution of import and export industries across countries
is very asymmetric.
5.2 Free Migration in the Non-Traded Sector
Endowments in the non-traded sector are SH
NTS =( 1− θNTS)SNTS in country H and SF
NTS =
θNTSSNTS in country F,w h e r eθNTS > 1
2. Domestic prices in the non-traded sector before the
introduction of free migration are then given by pH
NTS =
D−(1−θNTS)SNTS
b in country H and
pF
NTS = D−θNTSSNTS
b in country F. Under free migration, speciﬁc factors migrate from country
F to country H until domestic prices are equalised.36 Equalisation of domestic prices occurs
when migration has equalised the stocks of the speciﬁcf a c t o rSNTS between countries. Under
free migration, the price of the non-traded good is then given by pFM
NTS =
D−SNTS/2
b ,w h e r et h e
35See Appendix A.7.
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The economic eﬀects of free migration in the non-traded sector with inelastic supply functions
a r es u m m a r i s e di nF i g u r e2 .
Figure 2: Free migration (in the non-traded sector)
It is apparent from Figure 2 that there is a welfare gain for both countries under free mi-
gration.37 In country H, the welfare gain stems from the increase in consumer surplus (area
pFM
NTSDCpH
NTS) that outweighs the decrease in the speciﬁc factor reward (area pFM
NTSBCpH
NTS).
In country F, the welfare gain stems from the increase in the speciﬁc factor reward (area
pF
NTSABE) that outweighs the decrease in consumer surplus (area pF
NTSADE). Government
F always prefers free migration in the non-traded sector to the SQ, since the increase in the
speciﬁc factor reward outweighs the decrease in consumer surplus, and the speciﬁcf a c t o rr e -
ward receives a higher weight than consumer surplus in the domestic political process outlined
in Section 4.1.38 Government H’s stance on free migration in the non-traded sector depends
37Notice that this result does not depend on inelastic supply functions but is a general property of the speciﬁc
factors model under consideration.
38In the present context, applying Lemma 1 yields the reduced form government objective function Pr =
πNTS,r + aWNTS,r,w h e r er ∈ {SQ,FM}. Replacing WNTS,r by its elements and rearranging yields Pr =








EUI WP ECO 2005/6on the relative size of the change in factor rewards and consumer surplus and the weight the
government places on consumer surplus.
Evaluation of the change in factor rewards and average welfare in the non-traded sector of










































,t h es h a r eo ft h e
non-traded sector in country H’s change in the joint payoﬀ to the lobbies and the government






























is strictly positive if the following inequality
is satisﬁed:




For a given a, the government in country H endorses free migration in the non-traded sector
if θNTS is suﬃciently large. In words, given the weight it places on average welfare, country H’s
government endorses free migration if the endowment with the factor speciﬁc to the non-traded
sector is suﬃciently asymmetric across countries. The intuition for this result is as follows. When
θNTS is large, before free migration, production in the non-traded sector in country H is small
relative to demand. This implies that the lobby representing the non-traded sector in country
H is small relative to the consumption of the non-traded good. Hence, with a large θNTS,t h e
increase in consumer surplus from free migration outweighs the campaign contributions against
free migration in the domestic political process.
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large. In words, given the endowments of the two countries, country H’s government endorses
free migration in the non-traded sector if the weight it places on average welfare is suﬃciently
large. It can be shown that, for a =0 , the share of the non-traded sector in country H’s change





is always negative, while it
is always positive for a →∞ .41 The intuition for this result is as follows. If the government





is negative because free
migration reduces speciﬁc factor rewards in country H. If the government maximises average





is always positive since free migration increases average welfare
in country H.










depends additionally on SNTS, i.e., the aggregate size of the non-traded sector over the two
countries.42 This can be explained by the fact that there are two ways of varying the size
of the non-traded sector in country H, SH
NTS =( 1− θNTS)SNTS,e i t h e rb yv a r y i n gθNTS or
by varying SNTS.V a r y i n g θNTS changes the relative size of the change in the speciﬁcf a c t o r
rewards and consumer surplus from free migration, and may thus change the sign of the change





.V a r y i n gSNTS preserves
t h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h ec h a n g ei nt h es p e c i ﬁc factor rewards and consumer surplus from free
migration and does not, therefore, aﬀect the sign of the change in the joint payoﬀ to the lobbies





.I td o e s ,h o w e v e r ,a ﬀect the absolute size of the change in the






To summarise, under the above assumptions free migration in the non-traded sector is wel-
fare beneﬁcial for both the destination and the source country. While the source country’s
government always endorses free migration, anti-immigration lobbying from speciﬁcf a c t o r si n
the destination country might lead the destination country’s government to adopt an anti-
immigration stance. However, the more welfare beneﬁcial immigration is, the more favourable
the government’s stance toward immigration in the destination country is. The reason for this
is that, under the above assumptions, anti-immigration lobbying in the destination country de-
41See Appendix A.10.









EUI WP ECO 2005/6creases with the size of the welfare gain. The larger the price decrease resulting from immigration
is, the larger the welfare gain. In turn, the more asymmetric the endowment with the factor
speciﬁc to the non-traded sector, i.e., the larger θNTS is, the larger the price decrease. But when
θNTS is large, production in the destination country’s non-traded sector is small in relation to
demand. Then, even though campaign contributions per unit of speciﬁc factor are large, total
campaign contributions against immigration are small in relation to the destination country’s
welfare gain. So long as θNTS is suﬃciently large and hence total campaign contributions are
suﬃciently small relative to the welfare gain, the destination country’s government endorses free
migration in the non-traded sector.43
5 . 3 T h eC o m m o nM a r k e t( t h eC u s t o m sU n i o nC o m b i n e dw i t hF r e e
M i g r a t i o ni nA l lS e c t o r s )
In the two preceding sections, the viability of the CU and the viability of free migration in the
non-traded sector were analysed separately. The present section analyses the viability of a CM,
i.e., a CU combined with free migration in both the traded sectors and the non-traded sector.
O b s e r v et h a t ,i nt h et r a d e ds e c t o r s ,t h ea d d i t i o n a lintroduction of free migration results in the
same equilibrium as results from the introduction of a CU only. To see this, observe, ﬁrstly,
that in a CU prices are equalised between countries and thus no further incentives to migrate
remain. Secondly, note that for two small countries the intra-CU prices in the traded sectors
are pinned down at world prices plus the CU tariﬀ. In the traded sectors, the introduction
of the CM hence results in the same distribution of speciﬁc factors across countries and the
same intra-CU prices as the introduction of the CU without migration. The equilibrium in the
non-traded sector is not aﬀected by the introduction of the CU but only by the introduction of
free migration.44 The change in the joint payoﬀ to the lobbies and the government implied by
the transition from the SQ to the CM is then simply the sum of the change from the transition






















43This is in contrast to the results obtained for trade liberalisation in Grossman and Helpman (1995) who ﬁnd
that anti-liberalisation lobbying increases with the size of the welfare gain from trade liberalisation.
44Neary (1996) analyses a speciﬁc factors model that includes a non-traded sector in which part of the ad-
justment to liberalisation in the traded sectors is borne by the non-traded sector. In the present model, these
general equilibrium type of eﬀects are absorbed by the numeraire sector.
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SQ, PI
CU and PI
CM in both countries.
The constellation of PI
SQ, PI
CU and PI
CM, in turn, depends crucially on the model parameters s,
θNTS, a and SNTS. To illustrate this, it is helpful to consider the parameter constellations that
support the constellation under the three trade and migration policy regimes that is used in the








Consider, ﬁrstly, the parameter for the asymmetry in import and export industries, s.I th a s
been shown in Section 5.1 that PH
CU >P H
SQ for all s ≥ 1/2 but PF
CU <P F
SQ for s>s.S i n c e
under the constellation of joint payoﬀs to the lobbies and the government used in the example in
Section 4.2.1 PF
CU >PF
SQ, the asymmetry in import and export industries s has to be suﬃciently
low, i.e., s<s. Consider, secondly, the parameter for the asymmetry in the endowment with the
factor speciﬁc to the non-traded sector, θNTS, and the parameter for the weight governments
place on average welfare, a. It has been shown in Section 5.2 that PF
CM >PF




CM for θNTS + a
2(a+2) > 1. Since under the constellation of joint payoﬀst ot h e
lobbies and the government used in the example in Section 4.2.1 PH
CU >P H
CM, the parameters
θNTS and a must satisfy the condition θNTS + a
2(a+2) < 1. Consider, thirdly, the parameter






depends only on the parameters θNTS and a while its size depends additonally





< 0 and SNTS is suﬃciently large, then PH
CM <PH
SQ.
Since under the constellation of joint payoﬀs to the lobbies and the government used in the
example in Section 4.2.1 PF
CM >P F
SQ, the aggregate size of the non-traded sector over the two
countries must not exceed a critical threshold SNTS.45 The parameter constellations supporting
the constellation of joint payoﬀs to the lobbies and the government in country H and country
F used in the example in Section 4.2.1 are summarised in Table 4.









θNTS,a θNTS + a
2(a+2) < 1
SNTS SNTS < SNTS















EUI WP ECO 2005/6In words, a low asymmetry in the distribution of import and export industries, a low asym-
metry in the endowment with the factor speciﬁc to the non-traded sector, a low weight on
average welfare and a small size of the non-traded sector support the constellation of joint pay-
oﬀs under the three trade and migration policy regimes that is used in the example in Section
4.2.1. Since the joint payoﬀ to the lobbies and the government corresponds to the reduced form
government objective function deﬁn e di nL e m m a1t h i sc a nb er e p h r a s e da sf o l l o w s .B o t hg o v -
ernments prefer the CM over the SQ but while the CM is also government F’s most preferred
regime, government H’s most preferred regime is the CU. It has been shown in Section 4.2 that
under this constellation of joint payoﬀs the lobbies and the government, the equilibrium trade
and migration policy regime emerging from the bilateral negotiations depends on the order of
play in the ﬁrst stage of the game. If the countries move simultaneously in the ﬁrst stage, then
any of the three trade and migration policy regimes might emerge as the equilibrium regime
from the bilateral negotiations. If the countries move sequentially in the ﬁrst stage, then the
ﬁrst mover’s most preferred trade and migration policy regime emerges from the bilateral nego-
tiations. In particular, if country H moves ﬁrst, then the CM is rejected and the CU emerges
from the bilateral negotiations. In other words, although both governments prefer the most
comprehensive type of liberalisation, the CM, over the SQ, the CM is rejected in the bilateral
negotiations because of the availability of a less comprehensive type of liberalisation, the CU.
It has been shown in Section 5.2 that the CM as the most comprehensive type of liberalisation
is also the most welfare beneﬁcial, not only for the two countries as a whole but also for each
country separately. Hence, the rejection of the CM in the bilateral negotiations cannot be the
result of welfare considerations of the negotiating governments but can be attributed to the
governments’ sensitivity to political pressure from organised interest groups. In particular, po-
litical pressure from the lobby representing the non-traded sector in country H, the destination
country of migrants under the CM, skews the government’s stance in this country toward the
CU.
The constellation of the joint payoﬀs to the lobbies and the government in country H under
the three trade and migration policy regimes may be thought of as prevailing in the existing
member countries of the EU in the context of the Eastern Enlargement. All the governments in
the existing member countries preferred a CM with the acceding countries to the SQ. In contrast,
25
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not uniform. In countries that expected sizeable wage decreases from immigration from the
acceding countries and in which the non-traded sectors were nonetheless large and politically
well organised,46 as for example in Germany and Austria, governments preferred the CU to
the CM. In other existing member countries, such as the UK and Ireland, that either expected
smaller wage decreases from immigration or in which the non-traded sectors were politically less
organised, governments preferred the CM to the CU. The governments in the acceding countries
uniformly preferred the CU to the SQ and the CM to the CU. Their stance therefore corresponds
to the constellation of joint payoﬀs to the lobbies and the government in country F.A sa r g u e d
in Section 4.2.2, it is reasonable to assume that the existing member countries of the EU set the
agenda for the negotiations by selecting the CU as their preferred trade and migration policy
regime. Then, the above example provides an explanation of why the CM was rejected in the
negotiations over the Eastern Enlargement even if all negotiating governments preferred it to
the SQ.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The brief discussion of migration policies in the EU in the introductory section led to the
following observations. Firstly, anti-immigration sentiments seem to be pertinent mostly in the
non-traded sectors. Secondly, restrictive policies in the EU seem to be the result of political
pressures from organised interest groups rather than the result of political opposition to free
migration from the median voter. The main achievement of the present paper is to replicate these
two stylised facts in a formal political economy model. The underlying mechanism is factor price
equalisation through trade in the traded sectors so that incentives to migrate remain only in the
non-traded sector. Speciﬁc factor owners in the non-traded sector of the potential destination
country, who are the potential losers from immigration, are represented by an organised interest
group. Since, in the model, the government does not only take into account the welfare of the
general electorate but also campaign contributions, the organised interest group representing the
46In terms of model parameters, this corresponds to a limited degree of asymmetry: θNTS > 1/2 to allow for
a decrease in wages from immigration but θNTS + a





EUI WP ECO 2005/6non-traded sector succeeds in skewing the policy outcome toward restrictive migration policies.
Further, the present paper provides a positive explanation of the Eastern Enlargement of the
EU. It is argued that the distribution of importing and exporting sectors between the existing
member countries and the acceding countries was suﬃciently symmetric to make the govern-
ments of both groups of countries prefer the CU over the SQ. While the acceding countries’
governments perceived beneﬁts from additionally introducing free migration, the existing mem-
ber countries’ governments perceived political losses from expected immigration ﬂows. The latter
governments’ agenda setting power then allowed them to implement their preferred regime, the
CU, in the international negotiations.
The present paper ﬁnally suggests an explanation for Bhagwati’s (1991) puzzle of why ob-
served migration policies are more restrictive than observed trade policies. In the formal model,
the underlying mechanism is that trade ﬂows are bidirectional, in the sense that, in any given
country, there are both exporting and importing sectors, while migration ﬂows are unidirectional,
in the sense that, in any given country, there is either emigration or immigration. Factors em-
ployed in exporting sectors gain from trade liberalisation while factors employed in importing
sectors incur losses. Factors employed in sectors facing emigration gain from the liberalisation of
migration while factors employed in sectors facing immigration lose. The liberalisation of trade
thus generates both winners and losers in any given country, while liberalisation of migration
generates exclusively winners in the potential emigration country and exclusively losers in the
potential immigration country. In any given country, exporter interests are pitted against im-
porter interests on the trade liberalisation issue. In the potential immigration country, however,
there is no pro-immigration interest group pitted against the interest group representing factors
employed in the sectors potentially facing immigration.
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A Appendix
A.1 To show that dπi (pi)/dpi = xi (pi) > 0














i (pi) denotes the speciﬁc factor reward maximising amount of the mobile factor allo-



























A.2 To show that dCSi (pi)/dpi = −di (pi) < 0
Notice that the consumer surplus function can be written as
CSi (pi,d i (pi)) = ui (di (pi)) − pidi (pi),
where di (pi) denotes the consumer surplus maximising demand for good i at price pi.B yt h e
envelope theorem d
dpiCSi (pi,d i (pi)) = ∂
∂piCSi (pi,d i (pi)) so that
d
dpi




EUI WP ECO 2005/6A.3 Aggregate welfare, average welfare and welfare of the group own-
ing speciﬁcf a c t o rSi
If population size is normalised to one, the algebraic expressions for aggregate welfare and











where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side denotes the aggregate factor reward to the inter-
sectorally mobile factor M, πi (pi) denotes the factor reward to speciﬁcf a c t o rSi,a n dTi (pi,t i)
and CSi (pi) denote tariﬀ revenue and consumer surplus in sector i, respectively. Welfare of the
group owning speciﬁcf a c t o ri is then given by
Wi (p,t)=πi (pi)+αi [1 + T (p,t)+CS(p)]
For αi → 0, Wi = πi (pi), i.e., for very concentrated factor ownership, the group’s welfare
gross of lobby contributions can be approximated by the speciﬁc factor reward πi (pi).I f t h e
speciﬁc factor is distributed uniformly within the group owning speciﬁcf a c t o rSi, welfare of an








For αi → 0, the relative weight of the speciﬁc factor reward in the expression for the individual’s
factor owner’s welfare approaches inﬁnity.
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EUI WP ECO 2005/6where zi denotes the ratio of output to imports, ei is the elasticity of import demand and tV
i
denotes the ad valorem tariﬀ in sector i.F o rαL =0(very concentrated factor ownership) and













By noting that for pW
i =1the ad valorem tariﬀ tV
i may be replaced by the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ tS
i and
substituting Xi/mi (pi) for zi and −m0










i · pi/mi (pi)
is obtained. Since mi (pi) cancels out, −m0
i (pi)=b, 1+tS







A.5 To show that under parameter restriction R1 (ia) sectors with
production θ export, (ib) sectors with production (1 − θ) import
before the formation of the CU and (ii) the CU as a whole is an
importer on world markets
Assume for notational simplicity that production in sector i is θ in country H and (1 − θ) in
country F.
(ia) θ − (D − b) > 0 ⇔ θ>(D − b) (country H exports)
(ib) D − bpF
i − (1 − θ) > 0 (country F imports)
(ii) 2D − 2bpCU
i − 1 > 0 (CU is importer on world markets)
Note that (ib) is redundant: Whenever (ia) and (ii) are satisﬁed this implies that (ib) is
satisiﬁed. To see this, note in a ﬁrst step that if the left-hand side of (ib) is larger than the
left-hand side of (ii), then the binding constraint is (ii). Thus substract the left-hand side of (ii)
from the left-hand side of (ib) to obtain θ − (D − b). Note in a second step that this term is




EUI WP ECO 2005/6A.6 Derivation of equations (1) and (2)
With inelastic supply, the change in the speciﬁc factor reward can be written as the product of












−tCU (1 − θ) if SJ
i =( 1− θ)
.






obtain equation (1). To derive equation (2) evaluate additionally the change in consumer surplus
and the change in tariﬀ revenue from the CU. The change in consumer surplus can be written


























i =( 1− θ)
.
T h ec h a n g ei nt a r i ﬀ revenue is the diﬀerence between tariﬀ r e v e n u ei nt h eC Ua n dt a r i ﬀ revenue
























− (1 − θ) if SJ
i =( 1− θ)
¤

































A.7 To show that ∆CU
¡
PF¢










8ab (3θ − 1) > 0. Evaluating ∆CU
¡
PF¢
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for which the change
in the joint payoﬀ to the lobbies and the government in country F is zero. For a marginally
larger s, the change in the joint payoﬀ to the lobbies and the goverment is negative. According
to Lemma 1, goverment F always prefers the SQ to the CU in the traded sectors for such an
s. Because the transition from the SQ to the CU in the traded sectors requires the consent
of both negotiating governments, the CU in the traded sectors is rejected in the international
negotiations.
A.8 Derivation of equation (5) and equation (6)
Use the expressions for pH
NTS and pFM
NTS in combination with the assumption of inelastic supply
to evaluate the change in proﬁt sg i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) .U s et h ee x p r e s s i o n sf o rpH
NTS and pFM
NTS in
combination with the assumption of linear demand to evaluate the change in consumer surplus.
T a k et h es u mo ft h ec h a n g ei np r o ﬁts and the change in consumer surplus to obtain the change
in welfare given in in equation (6).
A.9 Derivation of equation (7)
Take the sum of the expressions for the change in proﬁts and the change in consumer surplus
given in equations (5) and (6) to obtain the change in the joint payoﬀ to the lobbies and the
government in country H.
A.10 To show that the share of the non-traded sector in the change
in the joint payoﬀ to the lobbies and the government in country
F from free migration is always negative for a =0and always
positive for a →∞
For a =0parameter restriction (R2) reduces to θ>1 which violates the deﬁnition of θ.F o r
a →∞parameter restriction (R2) reduces to θ>1/2 (by Hopital’s rule) which by deﬁnition of
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